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The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
bestowed upon the Securities and Exchange Commission the right to 
pursue an enforcement action against any person either in federal court or 
through an administrative proceeding.  Since 2012, the SEC has chosen to 
pursue an unprecedented percentage of its enforcement actions 
administratively, and it has prevailed in those administrative proceedings at 
a much higher rate than in federal court.  Since mid-2015, administrative 
respondents have begun turning to the federal courts for relief, alleging that 
administrative law judges, the SEC employees who preside over 
administrative proceedings, are appointed in violation of Article II’s 
Appointments Clause and therefore have no lawful authority to hear cases. 
The challengers found early success in a number of district courts, 
both in establishing subject matter jurisdiction and in securing preliminary 
injunctions on the merits.  Between August 2015 and December 2016, 
however, the momentum quickly shifted in favor of the SEC.  Five federal 
appellate courts—the Second, Fourth, Seventh, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuit 
Courts of Appeals—have all found that the federal courts lack subject 
matter jurisdiction to hear challenges addressing an ALJ’s constitutional 
authority to preside over an enforcement action until the respondent has 
exhausted all administrative remedies provided by the relevant statute.  In 
other words, the appellate courts have held that an administrative 
respondent may not collaterally attack the constitutionality of an 
administrative proceeding in federal court before the administrative 
proceeding is complete—rather, the administrative respondent must wait 
 *  J.D., 2016, University of Pennsylvania Law School.  I would like to thank the 
Honorable Cheryl Ann Krause of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
and Mary Mulligan of Friedman Kaplan Seiler & Adelman LLP for their invaluable 
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210 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 19:1 
for an adverse ALJ decision, appeal that decision directly to the full 
Commission, and only then, once the administrative proceeding has 
concluded, may the respondent seek judicial review through a proper 
federal court of appeals. 
While the jurisdictional question is now all but settled, the merits 
question is very much alive.  In August 2016, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, the first federal appellate court to rule on a 
fully ripe Appointments Clause challenge, held that SEC ALJs are mere 
employees of the SEC, not “inferior officers” within the meaning of Article 
II, and thus do not trigger Article II’s protections.  The D.C. Circuit’s 
decision represented a significant victory for the SEC.  In December 2016, 
however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit came to 
the opposite conclusion, holding that SEC ALJs are unconstitutionally 
appointed inferior officers and creating a significant circuit split worthy of 
Supreme Court review.  While the judicial landscape continues to rapidly 
evolve, administrative respondents seeking to challenge ALJs’ 
constitutional authority to hear cases should be emboldened by the Tenth 
Circuit’s decision.  Challengers should continue to assert that the SEC’s 
ALJ appointment scheme violates the Constitution, although they should 
now wait until the administrative proceeding is complete and should bring 
the subsequent judicial challenge in the federal court of appeals in the 
circuit in which they reside, rather than in the D.C. Circuit.  This Article 
encourages courts hearing such challenges to follow the Tenth Circuit, not 
the D.C. Circuit, and to hold that the SEC’s ALJ appointment scheme 
violates the protections provided by the Appointments Clause of Article II 
of the United States Constitution. 
In addition to the Appointments Clause challenges, the SEC has faced 
a deluge of criticism from judges, academics, and practitioners over its 
administrative system as a whole, which many feel gives the Commission 
an unfair advantage when it decides to pursue an enforcement action 
administratively.  While the SEC has steadfastly refused to reappoint its 
ALJs in accordance with the Appointments Clause, it has capitulated to the 
growing criticism by adopting a number of amendments to the Rules of 
Practice that govern its administrative proceedings and by promulgating 
guidance regarding forum selection.  This Article argues that these 
concessions are a step in the right direction but that they do not go far 
enough in leveling the playing field between the SEC and administrative 
respondents.  It also urges the SEC to undertake a number of concrete steps 
to restore public trust and to protect the constitutional rights of individuals 
and entities accused of wrongdoing. 
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INTRODUCTION
With its passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, Congress authorized the Securities and 
Exchange Commission to seek civil penalties from any person accused of 
violating the securities laws either in an administrative proceeding or in 
federal district court.1  Prior to Dodd-Frank, if the SEC wanted to seek 
monetary penalties from non-regulated entities or individuals, it had to 
bring its case in federal court. Now, the SEC can bring such cases 
administratively in its in-house courts in front of its in-house judges.  The 
newfound grant of power is significant, and the SEC has been taking full 
advantage of it. 
The Commission brought approximately eighty percent of its 
enforcement actions as administrative proceedings, rather than in federal 
district court, in the fiscal year ended September 30, 2015, which was 
roughly the same percent that it brought in the prior fiscal year but twenty 
percent more than its average between 2005 and 2013.2  The increased use 
 1.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 929P(a), 15 
U.S.C. § 78u-2 (2012). 
 2.  Select SEC and Market Data: Fiscal 2015, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION 3 tbl. 2 (2015), https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/select-sec-and-market-
data/secstats2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/HKR5-8DU5] [hereinafter Select SEC and Market 
Data 2015]; Select SEC and Market Data: Fiscal 2014, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION 3 tbl. 2 (2014), https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/select-sec-and-market-
data/secstats2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BP6-9LQE] [hereinafter Select SEC and Market 
Data 2014]. See also Ryan Jones, Comment, The Fight over Home Court: An Analysis of 
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of administrative proceedings should not be surprising, given that the SEC 
won more than ninety percent of its contested administrative proceedings 
from October 2010 through March 2015, while winning only sixty-nine 
percent of the cases it brought in federal court over the same period.3
The Commission’s noteworthy administrative winning percentage 
should not be surprising either, given the significant procedural advantages 
that come with bringing cases administratively.  Administrative 
proceedings operate on an expedited schedule, undermining respondents’ 
ability to prepare for hearings and defend themselves.4  Respondents in 
administrative proceedings are entitled to far less discovery than what is 
available in federal court, leaving respondents with little more than the 
record that the Commission itself developed during its investigation.5
Administrative proceedings are tried without a jury to an ALJ appointed, 
employed, and paid by the Commission,6 and appeals of adverse 
administrative decisions must be brought to the same five-member 
Commission that authorized the enforcement action in the first place.7
The Article proceeds in four parts.  First, it discusses SEC 
administrative proceedings generally, describes how administrative 
proceedings differ from cases brought in federal district court, and notes 
the SEC’s recent trend in favor of bringing a larger percentage of its 
enforcement actions administratively.  Second, the Article presents a 
number of criticisms and constitutional challenges levied at SEC 
administrative proceedings, arguing specifically that federal courts should 
rule that the SEC’s ALJ appointment scheme is unconstitutional.  Third, the 
Article discusses and evaluates the Commission’s two main responses to 
that criticism—adopting proposed amendments to its Rules of Practice and 
promulgating guidance regarding forum selection.  Finally, the Article 
concludes by suggesting a number of concrete steps that the SEC should 
take to ameliorate the constitutional violations and assuage concerns that 
administrative proceedings offer the SEC an unfair “home field 
advantage.”
the SEC’s Increased Use of Administrative Proceedings, 68 SMU L. REV. 507, 524 (2015) 
(collecting SEC enforcement action data from 2005 to 2014).  
 3.  Jean Eaglesham, SEC Wins with In-House Judges, WALL ST. J., May 6, 2015, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-wins-with-in-house-judges-1430965803
[https://perma.cc/AV2X-VCEQ] [hereinafter Eaglesham, SEC Wins].
 4.  17 C.F.R. § 201.360(a).  
 5.  17 C.F.R. § 201.230-234. 
 6.   5 U.S.C. § 5372; 5 C.F.R. § 930.204. 
 7.  17 C.F.R. § 201.410. 
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I. SEC ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
Congress created the Securities and Exchange Commission by statute 
in 19348 and charged it with serving the public by “enforcing the federal 
securities laws and regulating securities broker-dealers, investment 
advisers, and national securities exchanges.”9  The Commission fulfills its 
mission in a number of different ways, including through disciplinary 
actions brought by its Enforcement Division.10
Historically, the Commission could bring enforcement actions 
administratively only in limited circumstances, such as when the 
Commission was targeting regulated entities or seeking only cease-and-
desist orders or disgorgement.11  With its passage of the Dodd-Frank Act in 
2010, however, Congress authorized the Commission to seek a full range of 
remedies, including civil monetary penalties, from any party accused of 
wrongdoing, not simply from the industry insiders who it was previously 
allowed to target administratively.12
In administrative proceedings, an ALJ appointed and employed by the 
SEC presides over the matter and issues the initial decision.13  SEC ALJs 
enjoy career appointments, their salaries are specified by statute, and they 
are not subject to the probationary periods that apply to certain other 
government employees.14  In administrative proceedings, ALJs serve as the 
finder of fact and law and have powers and responsibilities nearly 
equivalent to those of a federal judge presiding over a bench trial, including 
administering oaths, issuing subpoenas, taking and ruling on the 
admissibility of evidence, and generally overseeing proceedings.15  ALJs 
ultimately decide whether the respondent violated the law,16 and their 
 8.  Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78pp (2012)).
 9.  DANIEL J. FETTERMAN & MARK P. GOODMAN, DEFENDING CORPORATIONS AND 
INDIVIDUALS IN GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATIONS § 7:1 (2015). 
 10.  See Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1978) (authorizing 
administrative agencies, such as the SEC, to conduct adjudicative proceedings 
administratively). See also U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, DIVISION OF 
ENFORCEMENT, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/about.htm [https://perma.cc/F8R4-
5CLY] (last visited Aug. 22, 2016) (“The Commission’s enforcement staff conducts 
investigations into possible violations of the federal securities laws, and prosecutes the 
Commission’s civil suits in the federal courts as well as its administrative proceedings.”).
 11.  See Duka v. SEC, 103 F. Supp. 3d 382, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“Prior to the 
enactment of Dodd-Frank, the SEC was authorized to impose civil penalties in 
Administrative Proceedings only against ‘regulated person[s]’ or companies.”). 
 12.  15 U.S.C. § 78u-2. 
 13.  5 C.F.R. § 930.204; 17 C.F.R. § 201.360. 
 14.  5 U.S.C. § 5372; 5 C.F.R. § 930.204(a). 
 15.  17 C.F.R. § 201.111. 
 16.  17 C.F.R. § 201.360. 
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decision is appealable to the full Commission.17  If the ALJ’s decision is 
not appealed or the Commission declines to review it, the Commission 
enters an order that the ALJ’s decision has become final and the action 
“shall, for all purposes, . . . be deemed the action of the Commission.”18
A. Administrative and Federal District Court Proceedings 
Differentiated 
While the remedies available to the SEC administratively and in 
federal district court are now comparable, administrative proceedings are 
fundamentally different from traditional federal district court proceedings.  
According to many, the differences redound almost entirely to the 
Commission’s benefit and “stack the deck”19 in a way that amounts to a 
“home court advantage”20 for the Commission. 
First, administrative proceedings move at a much faster pace than 
cases brought in federal district court.  Until recently, the presiding ALJ 
had only 300 days from the date of service of the Order Instituting 
Proceedings (“OIP”), the Commission’s charging instrument, to render a 
decision, and the hearing was required to be held within four months from 
the date of service of the OIP.21  Within those four months, the respondent 
needed to answer the OIP, review the Commission’s often-voluminous 
investigative file, prepare for the hearing, and attend the hearing.  In what 
remained of the 300 days, the respondent had to review the transcript and 
submit any post-hearing briefing.  Under the Commission’s July 13, 2016 
amendments to its Rules of Practice, respondents now have as many as ten 
months to prepare, instead of four.22  While counsel for the respondent still 
has a limited time to prepare, the Commission may take as long as it wants 
to investigate a case before filing the OIP, subject only to the applicable 
statute of limitations.  Given that the Commission has a very significant 
 17.  17 C.F.R. § 201.411. 
 18.  15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(c). 
 19.  SEC In-house Justice System Stacks the Deck, INVESTMENTNEWS (July 26, 2015, 
12:01 AM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20150726/REG/307269998/sec-in-
house-justice-system-stacks-the-deck [https://perma.cc/3WNM-TKC2]. 
 20.  Joel M. Cohen, Mary Kay Dunning, & Darcy Harris, SEC Plans to Play Insider-
Trading Cases on Home Court, NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, Sept. 16, 2014, 
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202670286446/SEC-Plans-to-Play-InsiderTrading-
Cases-on-Home-Court-?slreturn=20151022101115 [https://perma.cc/E24A-43GM]. 
 21.  17 C.F.R. § 201.360(a).  
 22.  U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Amendments to Commission’s Rules of 
Practice, Exchange Act Release No. 34-78319 (July 13, 2016), Final Rule 360, 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2016/34-78319.pdf [https://perma.cc/VGL4-KK8Z]; 17 
C.F.R. § 201.360(a).  For an extended discussion of the SEC’s amendments to its Rules of 
Practice, see infra Part III.A.
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amount of time to gather and review documents and to conduct extensive 
witness interviews before filing charges, some argue that the expedited 
administrative schedule undermines respondents’ abilities to defend 
themselves and calls into question the fairness of the entire administrative 
scheme.23
Second, respondents in administrative proceedings are entitled to far 
less discovery than is available in federal district court.  While the 
Commission is required to turn over much of its investigative file before 
serving the OIP and the respondent can ask the ALJ to issue subpoenas to 
third parties and to the Commission for documents and for testimony of 
witnesses who are unlikely to be available at the hearing,24 until the recent 
amendments, the Commission’s Rules of Practice contained no provisions 
for typical depositions or interrogatories.25  This means that respondents 
had to either call witnesses to the stand with no knowledge of what they 
might say, if they were not interviewed by the SEC and therefore not 
included in its investigative file, or for those that did testify before the 
Commission, with no ability to develop impeachment or respondent-
friendly material in advance.  Under the amended Rules of Practice, each 
side is permitted to take up to three depositions in a single-party 
administrative proceeding, up to five depositions in a multi-party 
administrative proceeding, and up to two additional depositions upon the 
showing of a compelling need.26  The Commission’s Rules also permit the 
introduction of hearsay and other evidence that would be inadmissible in 
federal court under the Federal Rules of Evidence.27  These limited 
discovery provisions leave respondents with little more than the record the 
Commission itself developed during the course of its investigation. 
Third, administrative proceedings are tried without a jury to an ALJ 
appointed, employed, and paid by the Commission, creating a potential for 
bias.28  Indeed, one former ALJ commented that she was criticized for 
finding in favor of respondents too often and that ALJs were expected to 
work under the assumption that “the burden was on the people who were 
accused to show that they didn’t do what the agency said they did.”29
While the rationale of utilizing ALJs to hear complex securities cases 
 23.  Jones, supra note 2, at 524. 
 24.  17 C.F.R. § 201.230-232. 
 25.  17 C.F.R. § 201.233-234.  
 26.  Rules of Practice, Exchange Act Release No. 34-78319 (July 13, 2016), Final Rule 
233; 17 C.F.R. § 201.233. 
 27.  See 17 C.F.R. § 201.320 (“The Commission or the hearing officer may receive 
relevant evidence and shall exclude all evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial or unduly 
repetitious.”).
 28.  5 U.S.C. § 5372; 5 C.F.R. § 930.204.
 29.  Eaglesham, SEC Wins, supra note 3.
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requiring specialized expertise has intuitive appeal, complex securities 
cases are not fundamentally different from general complex commercial 
cases, which federal district court judges and juries hear regularly.  Further, 
the need for a specialized decision-maker diminished considerably when 
the Commission expanded from bringing administrative proceedings only 
against regulated entities to bringing administrative proceedings against 
non-regulated entities.30
If a respondent is unsatisfied with an adverse ALJ determination, the 
respondent must appeal to the full Commission in the first instance.31
While the Commission’s review is de novo based on the record in the case, 
briefing, and argument,32 the Commission is the entity that authorized the 
Enforcement Division to bring the action against the respondent in the first 
place,33 meaning that the Commission “is akin to the prosecutor and then, 
in an appeal, the judge in the same case.”34  If the Commission affirms the 
ALJ’s decision, the respondent may then appeal to the United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit or to the federal court of 
appeals in the circuit in which the respondent resides.35  At that point, the 
court of appeals retains exclusive jurisdiction “to affirm or modify and 
enforce or set aside the order in whole or in part.”36  However, by the time a 
case reaches a federal court of appeals, the court of appeals’ role is quite 
limited because Commission administrative decisions are entitled to 
deference.37
 30.  Some commentators have pointed out that SEC ALJs are not even particularly 
specialized in securities law.  See David Zaring, Enforcement Discretion at the SEC, 94
TEX. L. REV. 1155, 1178 (2016) (chronicling the background of SEC ALJs, who often join 
the SEC from other administrative agencies such as the Social Security Administration, and 
concluding that “[a]s relative newcomers to securities work, these adjudicators did not come 
with a depth of knowledge about the nature of securities litigation or administrative 
proceedings at the SEC; nor would they have been known, and held in particular esteem, by 
the securities bar upon appointment”).  
 31.  17 C.F.R. § 201.410.  
 32.  17 C.F.R. §§ 201.411(a), 201.452.  
 33.  U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT,
ENFORCEMENT MANUAL § 2.5 (2015),
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf [https://perma.cc/J23F-
D4LJ]. 
 34.  Eaglesham, SEC Wins, supra note 3 (quoting Bradley Bondi, a former counsel to 
two former SEC commissioners).  
 35.  15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1).  
 36.  15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(3). 
 37.  See Chevron, USA v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 844-45 (1984) (holding that “a court 
may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable 
interpretation made by the administrator of an agency”). But see Flannery v. SEC, 810 F.3d 
1, 15 (1st Cir. 2015) (finding that a decision made by the full Commission was not 
supported by substantial evidence).  SEC ALJs’ formal rulings on otherwise undecided 
issues of statutory interpretation of the securities laws made in the context of administrative 
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B. Recent Trends in SEC Enforcement 
While the Dodd-Frank Act was signed into law in 2010, only recently 
has the Commission been taking advantage of its benefits by bringing a 
greater number of cases administratively.  The Commission initiated only 
462 administrative proceedings in fiscal year 2012, but it initiated 610 such 
proceedings in fiscal year 2014 and 645 in fiscal year 2015.38  Conversely, 
it initiated 272 civil actions in fiscal year 2012, but only 145 civil actions in 
fiscal year 2014 and 162 in fiscal year 2015.39  The number of enforcement 
actions brought administratively in fiscal years 2014 and 2015, as opposed 
to in federal court, amounted to approximately eighty percent of the SEC’s 
enforcement actions, while only sixty-three percent of its enforcement 
actions were brought administratively in fiscal year 2012.40  Between 2005 
and 2013, the SEC brought only fifty-nine percent of its enforcement 
actions administratively on average, over twenty percent less than in fiscal 
years 2014 and 2015.41  Indeed, one senior SEC official commented that it 
is “fair to say” that the increased use of administrative proceedings is “the 
new normal.”42
When the Commission does bring enforcement actions 
administratively rather than in federal court, it wins at a noteworthy rate.  
According to one study, the SEC won more than ninety percent of 
contested administrated proceedings from October 2010 through March 
2015, while winning only sixty-nine percent of its federal court cases over 
the same period.43  In 2014, the Commission won all six administrative 
hearings that came to verdict, but lost seven of the eighteen cases that it 
adjudications are entitled to Chevron deference in the same manner as are rules enacted by 
the Commission.  See Steven Croley, THE SCOPE OF CHEVRON 2-3 (July 2001) (unpublished 
manuscript), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/adminlaw/apa/chevronscopejuly.doc 
[https://perma.cc/C4X4-YRPM] (“The Supreme Court has made it clear that Chevron
deference is not to be confined to interpretations occasioned by agency rulemaking, 
however, but extends to agency interpretations made in connection with a formal 
adjudication, including enforcement actions.”).  
 38.  Select SEC and Market Data 2015 3 tbl. 2; Select SEC and Market Data 2014 3 tbl. 
2; Select SEC and Market Data: Fiscal 2012, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
3 tbl. 2 (2012), https://www.sec.gov/about/secstats2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/MMR8-
ASEV]. 
 39.  Id.
 40.  Id.
 41.  Jones, supra note 2, at 518.
 42.  Jean Eaglesham, SEC Is Steering More Trials to Judges It Appoints, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 21, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-is-steering-more-trials-to-judges-it-
appoints-1413849590 [https://perma.cc/5RZQ-58DF] (quoting Kara Brockmeyer, chief of 
the Enforcement Division’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Unit).  
 43.  Eaglesham, SEC Wins, supra note 3.
218 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 19:1 
litigated in federal court.44  Many expect that given its recent high-profile 
losses in federal court45 and the Commission’s “near-perfect” record before 
its ALJs, the Commission will continue to bring more cases 
administratively.46  Indeed, the Commission appeared to be bracing for 
such an increase when it hired two new ALJs in late 2014, bringing the 
total number of SEC ALJs to five,47 and when it increased the Office of 
Administrative Law Judges’ budget by forty-four percent for the 2014-
2015 fiscal year.48  The disparity in success rates has led commentators to 
observe that “ALJs’ close ties with the agency, combined with the 
[administrative law court] outcome record, suggests that there may exist 
some bias within the SEC’s [administrative law courts].”49
II. CHALLENGES TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE SCHEME
A. General Criticism 
The Commission has come under heavy criticism for its “new normal” 
of bringing administrative enforcement actions against non-regulated 
entities.  United States District Judge Jed S. Rakoff, for example, has 
warned of the “dangers that seem . . . to lurk in the S.E.C.’s apparent new 
policy of bringing a greater percentage of its significant enforcement 
actions as administrative proceedings.”50  Since formal administrative 
decisions made by ALJs are entitled to deference and most significant SEC 
cases, especially those involving complicated or novel questions of law, are 
brought under the general antifraud provisions of the federal securities 
 44.  Jones, supra note 2, at 519.
 45.  In two highly-publicized insider-trading cases, the SEC brought actions with novel 
and difficult legal theories in federal court. Both were dismissed by the district court, but 
the issues were ultimately resolved favorably to the SEC on appeal.  When the SEC retried 
the cases to juries on remand, the SEC lost both cases. See Jed. S. Rakoff, PLI Securities 
Regulation Institute Keynote Address, Is the S.E.C. Becoming a Law Unto Itself?, Nov. 5, 
2014, https://securitiesdiary.files.wordpress.com/2014/11/rakoff-pli-speech.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/U8U8-LCE7] (citing SEC v. Obus and SEC v. Cuban).
 46.  See, e.g., David A. Wilson, Coming to an Administrative Law Judge Near You: 
Insider-Trading Cases, 30 No. 12 WESTLAW J. CORP. OFFICERS & DIRECTORS LIAB. 2 
(2014).
 47.  Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Announces New 
Hires in the Office of Administrative Law Judges, Release No. 2014-129 (June 30, 2014), 
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370542202073
[https://perma.cc/WC8E-KMXK]. 
 48.  Eaglesham, SEC Wins, supra note 3.
 49.  Tyler L. Spunaugle, Comment, The SEC’s Increased Use of Administrative 
Proceedings: Increased Efficiency or Unconstitutional Expansion of Agency Power?, 34
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 406, 413 (2015). 
 50.  Rakoff, supra note 45, at 1. 
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laws,51 Judge Rakoff expressed his concern that the increase in 
administrative enforcement actions may effectively lead to the securities 
laws being made “not by neutral federal courts, but by S.E.C. 
administrative judges.”52  According to Judge Rakoff, a trend toward 
preferring administrative proceedings to federal courts will “hinder[] the 
balanced development of the securities laws” and will be “unlikely . . . to 
lead to as balanced, careful, and impartial interpretations as would result 
from having those cases brought in federal court.”53
Commentators have criticized the Commission on public policy 
grounds as well.  One commentator has theorized that a main reason the 
SEC is bringing an increased number of cases administratively is to gain 
increased bargaining power.54  Indeed, Andrew Ceresney, the Director of 
the SEC’s Enforcement Division, has acknowledged that simply by 
threatening to bring an enforcement action administratively rather than in 
federal court, the Commission enjoys increased bargaining power in 
settlement talks.55  Since the majority of cases settle before trial, increased 
bargaining power in settlement negotiations provides the Commission with 
a significant advantage.  Commentators have also argued that the SEC 
“places far too much significance on simply winning cases and collecting 
monetary penalties . . . rather than deterring future illegal action and 
protecting the public,” which may lead non-regulated entities to see 
settlements as a “cost of doing business.”56
Congress has held hearings to examine the constitutionality of ALJ 
appointments and related constitutional issues of due process, with the 
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Capital Markets remarking on the “very 
troubling pattern of the SEC’s attempting to stack the rules and process in a 
way that the outcome of the case is, well, predetermined.”57
 51.  Judge Rakoff also pointed out that the development of the law under the “catch-all 
provisions” of Section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act and Section 10(b) of the 1934 
Securities Exchange Act has “mostly been judge-made.” Id. at 8. 
 52.  Id. at 10.
 53.  Id. at 7, 11.
 54.  Spunaugle, supra note 49, at 411.
 55.  Brian Mahoney, SEC Could Bring More Insider Trading Cases In-House, LAW360,
(June 11, 2014, 6:53 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/547183/sec-could-bring-more-
insider-trading-cases-in-house [https://perma.cc/UQ3U-QLW5] (“I will tell you that there 
have been a number of cases in recent months where we have threatened administrative 
proceedings, it was something we told the other side we were going to do and they 
settled.”).
 56.  Jones, supra note 2, at 532. 
 57.  Oversight of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. 
on Capital Markets and Government Sponsored Enterprises, 114th Cong. 2-3 (2015) 
(statement of Rep. Scott Garrett) (“While bringing more cases through the administrative 
proceedings can lead to lower costs for the agency and increases in efficiency, it is 
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Senior Commission officials have steadfastly defended the integrity of 
the Commission’s increased used of administrative proceedings.  SEC 
Chair Mary Jo White has called the Commission’s use of administrative 
proceedings “very fair.”58  Ceresney has stated that the Commission’s use 
of administrative forums is “eminently proper, appropriate, and fair to 
respondents.”59  Specifically, Ceresney noted that the Commission’s 
relaxed evidentiary rules can even “benefit the respondents” because 
“witnesses’ recollections are fresher” and the rules may give respondents 
“more flexibility in offering evidence.”60  The Commission has also argued 
that by relying on ALJs, it is taking advantage of subject matter experts to 
fairly and efficiently resolve “complicated . . . securities and financial 
law . . . cases that the district courts are often ill-prepared to handle,” 
freeing up “overburdened district courts, potentially providing benefits for 
the entire legal system.”61
B. Constitutional Challenges 
The most significant criticisms facing the SEC come not from federal 
judges in their personal capacities or legal commentators but from 
respondents bringing constitutional challenges to the Commission’s right to 
pursue enforcement actions outside of federal court.  The constitutional 
challenges have been brought in several forms,62 but the most noteworthy 
important to realize that those benefits come with a cost.  The cost is less due-process 
protections for defendants.”).  Representative Garrett also introduced legislation intending to 
“restore due process rights for all Americans” by granting administrative respondents a 
mandatory right of removal to federal district court.  Due Process Restoration Act of 2015, 
H.R. 3798, 114th Congress (2015-2016); Press Release, Representative Scott Garrett, House 
of Representatives, Garrett Introduces Bill to Restore Due Process Rights for All Americans 
(Oct. 22, 2015), http://garrett.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/garrett-introduces-bill-
to-restore-due-process-rights-for-all-americans [https://perma.cc/U2LF-RBSN].  The 
legislation, which would essentially eliminate administrative proceedings as a mechanism 
for resolving securities fraud matters, has yet to receive a full House vote.  The Financial 
CHOICE Act of 2016, the bill introduced by Republicans to overhaul Dodd-Frank, contains 
a similar provision.  Financial CHOICE Act of 2016, H.R. 5983, 114th Congress (2015-
2016).
 58.  Yuka Hayashi, SEC’s White Defends In-House Courts, but Sees Need to 
Modernize, WALL ST. J. MONEYBEAT (Nov. 17, 2015, 2:52 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2015/11/17/secs-white-defends-in-house-courts-but-sees-
need-to-modernize [https://perma.cc/2T29-NS54]. 
 59.  Andrew Ceresney, Remarks to the American Bar Association’s Business Law 
Section Fall Meeting (Nov. 21, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/
1370543515297 [https://perma.cc/ZY5B-CA7C]. 
 60.  Id.
 61.  Spunaugle, supra note 49, at 411. 
 62.  Additional challenges have been brought under Article I, the Seventh Amendment, 
and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.  These challenges have been uniformly 
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challenge arises under Article II’s Appointments Clause. 
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
In response to these constitutional challenges, the Commission has 
argued that federal courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the 
challenges until the challenging party has exhausted all possible 
administrative remedies.63  The argument rests on 15 U.S.C. § 78y, which 
provides that judicial review of administrative proceedings can come only 
from a federal court of appeals, and only after the administrative 
proceeding has concluded and the Commission has issued a final order.64
While federal district courts have original jurisdiction over claims arising 
under the Constitution,65 Congress may restrict that original jurisdiction 
with a statutory scheme that “displays a ‘fairly discernible’ intent to limit 
jurisdiction, and [if] the claims at issue ‘are of the type Congress intended 
to be reviewed within the statutory structure.’”66  The Commission has 
argued that Congressional intent to limit jurisdiction is clear from the text 
of 15 U.S.C. § 78y and the claims at issue are of the type that Congress 
intended to be reviewed within the statutory scheme.67
Plaintiffs seeking to collaterally attack their administrative 
proceedings in federal district court prior to the conclusion of the 
administrative process experienced early success in establishing federal 
subject matter jurisdiction.68  In order for a constitutional claim against the 
SEC to receive an intermediate ruling, the plaintiff must show that (1) “a 
finding of preclusion could foreclose all meaningful judicial review,” (2) 
the suit is “wholly collateral to [the] statute’s review provisions,” and (3) 
the “claims are outside [of] the agency’s expertise.”69  First, courts held that 
rejected. See, e.g., Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1316 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (rejecting a 
Seventh Amendment argument), vacated on other grounds, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016). 
 63.  See, e.g., id. at 1305. 
 64.  Id.
 65.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all 
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treatises of the United States.”).  
 66.  Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 489 (2010) 
(quoting Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 207-12 (1994)). 
 67.  Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1305-06. 
 68.  Ironridge Global IV, Ltd. v. SEC, 146 F. Supp. 3d 1294, 1302-04 (N.D. Ga. 2015); 
Duka v. SEC, 103 F. Supp. 3d 382, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1305-06; 
Timbervest, LLC v. SEC, No. 1:15-CV-2106-LMM, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132082, at *20 
(N.D. Ga. Aug. 4, 2015); Gray Financial Group v. SEC, No. 1:15-CV-0492-LMM, 2015 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131792, at *33 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 4, 2015), vacated, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th 
Cir. 2016).
 69.  Free Enter. Fund, 516 U.S. at 489 (quoting Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 212-13 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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the statutory scheme for judicial review is not meaningful because if the 
plaintiff were required to raise his constitutional claims following the entire 
administrative proceeding, he would be forced to endure what he contends 
is an unconstitutional process.70  Further, if a plaintiff were forced to endure 
the entire administrative process before raising his claim, the plaintiff’s 
claim would be moot because a court of appeals cannot foreclose an 
unconstitutional proceeding that has already occurred.71  Second, courts 
held that constitutional claims are wholly collateral to the administrative 
proceeding because the plaintiffs are not challenging the Commission’s 
decision, but rather the Commission’s ability to constitutionally make that 
decision.72  Third, courts held that constitutional challenges are outside of 
the Commission’s expertise because constitutional claims are governed by 
Supreme Court jurisprudence, not “technical considerations of agency 
policy.”73
While plaintiffs experienced early success in establishing subject 
matter jurisdiction, the SEC has achieved a number of significant appellate 
victories over the past seventeen months, virtually settling the law 
regarding jurisdiction in the SEC’s favor.  Between August 2015 and 
December 2016, five federal appellate courts—the Second, Fourth, 
Seventh, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuit Courts of Appeals—held that the 
statutory scheme contained in 15 U.S.C. § 78y provides the exclusive 
mechanism for a party seeking review of an adverse administrative 
decision.74  Analyzing the Free Enterprise factors, the courts first 
determined that the administrative scheme does not foreclose all 
meaningful judicial review because, even if constitutional claims cannot be 
raised administratively, the statutory scheme provides for federal appellate 
court review of those claims after the plaintiff has exhausted the 
administrative process.75  Second, the courts held that the constitutional 
 70.  See, e.g., Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1307-09; see also Jones, supra note 2, at 523 
(commenting that winning a federal securities case on a constitutional issue after all 
administrative remedies have been exhausted may be “little more than a Pyrrhic victory” 
since by that point “[a]ll the clients and business will have already left, and the respondent 
will have nothing left to fight for”). 
 71.  Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1307-09. 
 72.  See, e.g., id. at 1309. 
 73.  See, e.g., id. at 1309-10. 
 74.  Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d 1236, 1241 (11th Cir. 2016); Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276, 
282 (2d Cir. 2016); Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9, 29-30 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Bebo v. SEC, 799 
F.3d 765, 775 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1500 (2016); Bennett v. SEC, No. 15-
2584, slip op. at 30 (4th Cir. Dec. 16, 2016). 
 75.  See, e.g., Hill, 825 F.3d at 1243. See also Bebo, 799 F.3d at 775 (“This Court’s 
jurisdiction is not an escape hatch for litigants to delay or derail an administrative action 
when statutory channels of review are entirely adequate.”) (quoting Chau v. SEC, 72 F. 
Supp. 3d 417, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)).
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claims are not “wholly collateral” to any Commission orders or rules from 
which review might be sought because the plaintiffs have raised the 
constitutional issue as an affirmative defense and the Commission will 
eventually rule on those claims in its final orders.76  Third, the courts held 
that the Commission and its ALJs are “fully capable” of hearing 
constitutional challenges, at least in the first instance.77
While it is likely that the recent precedent created by the Second, 
Fourth, Seventh, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits will continue to gain traction 
across the country, reviewing courts in other circuits should consider 
finding subject matter jurisdiction and proceeding to the merits of the 
constitutional challenge.  There is a strong argument that all of the Free
Enterprise factors are satisfied and the courts denying jurisdiction came to 
an incorrect conclusion.  First, judicial review under the administrative 
scheme should not be considered meaningful because, even though a 
federal court of appeals could vacate an adverse Commission order on 
constitutional grounds, it could not remedy the harm that the plaintiff 
attempted to allege in district court.  Judicial review that comes at a point 
when the harm alleged cannot possibly be remedied should not be 
considered meaningful.  Second, the constitutional claims should be 
considered wholly collateral to the Commission decisions from which 
review is sought because the claims do not depend upon the facts of any 
particular case.  Even if a plaintiff raised the issue as an affirmative 
defense, as the plaintiff must to preserve his ability to later object, the 
constitutional challenge is entirely unrelated to the underlying alleged 
securities law violation.  For that reason, the constitutional challenge 
should also be considered outside of the ALJs’ expertise.  Questions of 
administrative and constitutional law are squarely within the province of 
federal judges, not SEC employees.  Therefore, reviewing courts should 
consider holding that they do have jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs’ 
constitutional claims and proceeding to the merits of those claims. 
2. Appointments Clause Violation 
The most significant constitutional challenge facing the Commission 
asserts that the Commission’s scheme for appointing ALJs violates the 
Appointments Clause of Article II of the United States Constitution and 
therefore the ALJs designated as hearing officers have no lawful authority 
to preside over cases.78  Article II provides that “Congress may by Law vest 
 76.  See, e.g., Tilton, 824 F.3d at 287-88.
 77.  See, e.g., Jarkesy, 803 F.3d at 28.
 78.  See, e.g., Tilton v. SEC, No. 15-CV-2472 (RA), 2015 WL 4006165, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2015), aff’d, 824 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2016); Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 
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the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the 
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”79
Commission ALJs are not appointed by the President, the courts, or the 
SEC Commissioners, but are instead hired by the SEC’s Office of 
Administrative Law Judges, with input from the Chief Administrative Law 
Judge, human resource functions, and the Office of Personnel 
Management.80  Accordingly, respondents have contended that the ALJ 
appointment scheme is unconstitutional. 
While arguing about the precise technicalities of how ALJs are 
appointed may seem pedantic, the Supreme Court has recognized that the 
Appointments Clause is “more than a matter of ‘etiquette or protocol’; it is 
among the significant structural safeguards of the constitutional scheme.”81
Its fundamental purpose is to preserve “the Constitution’s structural 
integrity by preventing the diffusion of the appointment power” by 
guarding against Congressional encroachment upon the Executive 
Branch.82
On the merits, the Commission has argued that, even if federal district 
courts do have subject matter jurisdiction, the Appointments Clause claims 
should fail because its ALJs are not “inferior officers” under the 
Constitution, but are instead mere employees, the hiring and firing of 
whom is not governed by Article II.83  (Indeed, the full Commission came 
to that conclusion itself in an appealed administrative proceeding.84)  An 
appointee is an inferior officer, and not a mere employee, if the appointee 
exercises “significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States.”85
To determine whether an appointee exercises “significant authority,” courts 
look to “(1) the significance of the matters resolved by the officials, (2) the 
discretion they exercise in reaching their decisions, and (3) the finality of 
those decisions.”86  The Commission relied on Landry v. FDIC to argue 
that since ALJs cannot issue final orders, they cannot be considered inferior 
1297, 1305 (N.D. Ga. 2015), vacated, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016). 
 79.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  
 80.  See generally 5 C.F.R. § 930.204 (discussing the ALJ appointment process). 
 81.  Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 659 (1997) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1, 125 (1976) (per curiam)).  
 82.  Freytag v. Comm’r., 501 U.S. 868, 878 (1991).  See also Ryder v. United States, 
515 U.S. 177, 182 (1995) (“The Clause is a bulwark against one branch aggrandizing its 
power at the expense of another branch . . . .”).  
 83.  See, e.g., Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1317. 
 84.  In the Matter of Raymond J. Lucia Companies, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 
75837, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4190, Investment Company Act Release No. 
31806, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-15006, 2015 WL 5172953, at *23 (Sept. 3, 2015), aff’d, No. 
15-1345, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 14559 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 9, 2016). 
 85.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126. 
 86.  Tucker v. Comm’r, 676 F.3d 1129, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 2012).  
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officers.87  In Landry, the D.C. Circuit considered whether FDIC ALJs 
were inferior officers and held that they were not because they could not 
issue final orders, even though their office is established by law, their 
duties, salaries, and means of appointment are specified by statute, and they 
conduct trials, take testimony, rule on evidence admissibility, enforce 
discovery compliance, and exercise significant discretion.88
Before appellate cases Bebo, Bennett, Jarkesy, Tilton, and Hill were 
decided in the past seventeen months, the district courts finding subject 
matter jurisdiction and reaching the merits had uniformly ruled in favor of 
the plaintiffs and preliminarily enjoined the SEC from pursuing the 
plaintiffs’ cases administratively, relying on Freytag v. Commissioner and
finding that the ALJ appointments likely violated Article II’s Appointment 
Clause.89  In Freytag, the Supreme Court held that Tax Court “special trial 
judges” are inferior officers because the office is established by law, the 
duties, salary, and means of appointment are specified by statute, and the 
judges perform significant tasks such as taking testimony, conducting trials, 
ruling on the admissibility of evidence, enforcing compliance with 
discovery orders, issuing final decisions in certain limited circumstances, 
and exercising significant discretion throughout.90  Relying on Freytag, the 
district courts held that, like the special trial judges in that case, SEC ALJs 
exercise “significant authority” and discretion sufficient to make them 
inferior officers.91  The district court in Hill, for example, concluded that 
“the Supreme Court in Freytag found that the [special trial judges’] 
powers—which are nearly identical to the SEC ALJs[’] here—were 
independently sufficient to find that [special trial judges] were inferior 
officers.”92  It reasoned that Landry was incorrect in reading Freytag as 
holding that authority to render a final decision is a necessary factor for an 
appointee to be considered an inferior officer.93
In August 2016, a federal appellate court reviewed a fully ripe 
Appointments Clause challenge for the first time.  In Lucia v. SEC, an SEC 
ALJ imposed sanctions on Lucia for violating the Investment Advisors Act 
 87.  Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1317-18. 
 88.  Landry, 204 F.3d at 1133-34.
 89.  Ironridge Global IV, Ltd. v. SEC, 146 F. Supp. 3d 1294, 1316-17 (N.D. Ga. 2015); 
Duka v. SEC, 124 F. Supp. 3d 287, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1320-21; 
Gray Financial Group v. SEC, No. 1:15-CV-0492-LMM, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131792, at 
*46-*51 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 4, 2015), vacated, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016). 
 90.  Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 881-82 (1991).  
 91.  Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1317; Ironridge Global IV, 146 F. Supp. 3d. at 1313; Duka,
124 F. Supp. 3d at 289. 
 92.  Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1318. 
 93.  Id.
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of 1940 and the rule against misleading advertising.94  In accordance with 
the statutory review scheme provided for in § 78y, Lucia waited for the full 
Commission to rule against him and appealed the decision to the D.C. 
Circuit, arguing that the ALJ who heard the enforcement action was 
unconstitutionally appointed.95
The D.C. Circuit came to the opposite conclusion from the district 
courts that reached the merits and ruled in favor of the SEC.96  Although 
the Commission acknowledged that the ALJ who heard Lucia’s case was 
not appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause, the D.C. 
Circuit held that Article II did not apply because the ALJ was a mere 
employee of the SEC, not an inferior officer.97  Relying on Landry, the 
D.C. Circuit determined that the presence or absence of final decision-
making power is “critical” to determining whether an appointee is an 
inferior officer, and its analysis “beg[an], and end[ed],” there.98  Because an 
ALJ decision cannot “be deemed the action of the Commission” until the 
Commission issues a final order, the court held that SEC ALJs are mere 
employees, not inferior officers, and thus do not trigger the protections of 
Article II.99
In December 2016, however, a second federal appellate court 
reviewed a fully ripe Appointments Clause challenge and came to the 
opposite conclusion.  In Bandimere v. SEC, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that SEC ALJs are appointed in 
violation of the Appointments Clause, marking the first time that a federal 
appellate court has accepted an argument challenging the constitutionality 
of the SEC’s ALJ appointment scheme and creating a significant circuit 
split.100
The court in Bandimere utilized much of the same reasoning that the 
district courts used in preliminarily enjoining the SEC from pursuing cases 
administratively.   Relying on Freytag, the court held that SEC ALJs are 
inferior officers under the Appointments Clause because the office of the 
SEC ALJ is established by law, statutes set forth SEC ALJs’ duties, 
salaries, and means of appointment, and SEC ALJs exercise “significant 
discretion” in performing the same types of “important functions” as the 
 94.  Lucia v. SEC, No. 15-1345, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 14559, at *2 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 9, 
2016).
 95.  Id.
 96.  Id. at *44.
 97.  Id. at *9, *19-*25.
 98.  Id. at *12-*14.
 99.  15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(c); id. at *19-*25. 
 100.  Bandimere v. SEC, No. 15-9586, slip op. at 22 (10th Cir. Dec. 27, 2016). 
2016] DEVELOPMENTS IN SEC ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 227 
special trial judges did in Freytag.101  The court rejected the SEC’s 
argument and the D.C. Circuit’s holding in Lucia that ALJs’ lack of final 
decision-making power is dispositive.102  According to the court, “[f]inal 
decision-making power is relevant in determining whether a public servant 
exercises significant authority.  But that does not mean every inferior
officer must possess final decision-making power.  Freytag’s holding 
undermines that contention.  In short, the [Supreme] Court did not make 
final decision-making power the essence of inferior officer status.”103
Because ALJs are inferior officers subject to the Appointments Clause and 
the SEC ALJ at issue held his office unconstitutionally when he presided 
over Bandimere’s hearing, the Tenth Circuit set aside the SEC’s opinion 
imposing liability on Bandimere.104
The Tenth Circuit’s argument better comports with Supreme Court 
precedent, and courts confronted with an Appointments Clause challenge 
should hold that SEC ALJs are inferior officers.  ALJs wield significant 
authority and exercise significant discretion pursuant to the laws of the 
United States, even if they cannot issue final orders.  The office of the ALJ 
is established by law, and ALJs’ duties, salaries, and means of appointment 
are specified by statute.  ALJs are permanent employees who have the 
power to take testimony, conduct trials, rule on the admissibility of 
evidence, and enforce compliance with discovery orders.105  They also have 
authority to issue initial decisions that declare respondents liable and 
impose sanctions,106 and to enter default judgments and steer the outcome 
of proceedings by requiring attendance at settlement conferences.107  As the 
Tenth Circuit noted in Bandimere, nothing in Freytag indicates that the 
ability to issue a final order is a necessary condition for an official to be 
considered an inferior officer.108 Indeed, as the Landry concurrence noted, 
the Landry majority’s holding was based on an alternative holding from 
Freytag, since the Supreme Court had already determined that special trial 
 101. Id., slip op. at 17-19.  As the Tenth Circuit pointed out, its holding serves 
the purposes of the Appointments Clause.  “The current ALJ hiring process 
whereby the OPM screens applicants, proposes three finalists to the SEC, and then 
leaves it to somebody at the agency to pick one, is a diffuse process that does not 
lend itself to the accountability that the Appointments Clause was written to 
secure.  In other words, it is unclear where the appointment buck stops.” Id., slip 
op. at 23.
 102.  Id., slip op. at 28. 
 103.  Id. (emphasis in original).  
104. Id., slip op. at 37. 
 105.  5 C.F.R. § 930.204; 17 C.F.R. §§ 200.14, 201.180.  
 106.  17 C.F.R. §§ 200.14(a)(8), 200.30-9(a), 201.360.  
 107.  17 C.F.R. §§ 201.155, 201.111(e). 
108. Bandimere, slip op. at 27. 
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judges were inferior officers before it analyzed the final order authority 
issue.109  The special trial judges’ limited authority to issue a final order 
was only an additional reason, not the reason, that the Supreme Court held 
that Tax Court special trial judges are inferior officers.110  Therefore, the 
presence or absence of final decision-making authority should not be 
dispositive.
Even if SEC ALJs cannot issue final orders, the significant authority 
and discretion bestowed upon them should be sufficient for them to be 
considered inferior officers.  Much like the “district court clerk,” 
“thousands of clerks in the Departments of Treasury [and the] Interior,” the 
“assistant surgeon,” “cadet-engineer,” “election monitors,” “federal 
marshals,” “military judges,” “judges in Article I courts,” and “the general 
counsel of the Department of Transportation,” all of which the Supreme 
Court has held are inferior officers,111 SEC ALJs should be considered 
inferior officers and trigger Article II protections. 
Once a court determines that ALJs are inferior officers, the 
Appointments Clause violation is apparent.  SEC ALJs are not appointed 
by the President, the courts of law, or the SEC Commissioners, as is 
required by Article II, but are instead hired by the SEC’s Office of 
Administrative Law Judges, with input from the Chief Administrative Law 
Judge, human resource functions, and the Office of Personnel 
Management.112  Indeed, the SEC itself admitted in Lucia that its ALJs are 
not appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause.113
Accordingly, reviewing courts should find the ALJ appointment scheme to 
be unconstitutional. 
C. Consequences of a Finding of Unconstitutionality 
A Supreme Court determination that the SEC’s ALJ appointment 
process is unconstitutional would affect not only the SEC, but also all 31 
other federal administrative agencies, which together appoint more than 
1,300 ALJs.114  The Commodities and Futures Trading Commission, for 
 109.  Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Randolph, J., concurring). 
 110.  Id.
 111. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 540 (2010) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
 112.  5 C.F.R. § 930.204; 17 C.F.R. § 200.14 
 113.  Lucia v. SEC, No. 15-1345, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 14559, at *9 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 9, 
2016).
 114.  Peter J. Henning, S.E.C. Faces Challenges Over the Constitutionality of Some of Its 
Court Proceedings, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2015, 8:58 AM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2015/01/27/s-e-c-faces-challenges-over-the-constitutionality-
of-some-of-its-court-proceedings/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/V4UH-ZKQK]. 
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example, uses ALJs in much the same manner as the SEC does and CFTC 
ALJs have nearly equivalent powers as do SEC ALJs.115  The CFTC’s 
administrative practice is relatively new, and it does not yet appear to have 
been challenged in federal court.  However, former CFTC Chairman 
William T. Bagley characterized the administrative scheme in which “the 
Commission itself is a rule maker, policeman, grand jury, prosecutor, judge 
and jury with de novo powers in the same case at virtually the same time” 
as “undue process.”116
The Federal Trade Commission, which also employs ALJs, has taken 
a different path in response to constitutional challenges brought under the 
Appointments Clause.  On September 14, 2015, the FTC denied a 
respondent’s motion to dismiss an FTC administrative proceeding, holding 
that, under Landry, its ALJs are not inferior officers because their initial 
decisions are reviewed by the FTC Commissioners before becoming 
final.117  Nevertheless, the FTC Commissioners ratified the ALJ’s 
appointment to “put[] to rest any possible claim that this administrative 
proceeding violates the Appointments Clause.”118
While an appellate ruling that the ALJ appointment process is 
unconstitutional would create problems for the SEC, such a ruling would 
not be fatal.  Final administrative decisions would not be subject to attack 
because even when an adjudicator lacks the power to decide a case, the 
presumption in favor of finality means that once a judgment has become 
final, the issue cannot be raised collaterally.119  Administrative proceedings 
 115.  Indeed, many CFTC ALJs may actually be SEC ALJs themselves. Since the 
CFTC’s Director of Enforcement recently announced that the CFTC intends to start using 
administrative proceedings for enforcement cases after a number of years in which it never 
did so, the CFTC has been “borrowing” ALJs from other areas of the government.  Jean 
Eaglesham, CFTC Turns Toward Administrative Judges, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2014, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/cftc-turns-toward-administrative-judges-1415573398
[https://perma.cc/5XC8-Y453].  Much like SEC administrative proceedings, CFTC 
administrative proceedings may be more challenging for respondents than federal court 
proceedings because of the lack of depositions and the limits on third party discovery. 17 
C.F.R. § 10.42-44. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 10.8 (describing the functions and responsibilities 
of CFTC ALJs) with 17 C.F.R. § 200.14 (describing the functions and responsibilities of 
SEC ALJs). 
 116.  Dan M. Berkovitz, The Resurrection of CFTC Administrative Enforcement 
Proceedings: Efficient Justice or a Biased Forum?, 35 No. 2 FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L.
REP. 1 (2015), quoting William T. Bagley, Introduction: A New Body of Law in an Era of 
Industry Growth, 27 EMORY L.J. 849, 851 (1978).
 117.  In the Matter of LabMD, Inc., No. 9357, 2015 WL 5608167, at *1, *2 (F.T.C. Sept. 
14, 2015).
 118.  Id. at *2. 
 119.  Peter D. Hardy, Carolyn H. Kendall, & Abraham J. Rein, The Appointment of SEC 
Administrative Law Judges: Constitutional Questions and Consequences for Enforcement 
Actions, 47 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1238 (BNA) (2015) (citing Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 
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that have already been brought but in which a decision is not yet final 
would likely be voided and vacated without prejudice, allowing the SEC to 
bring the action again at a later time in front of a properly appointed 
hearing officer.120  A ruling that the ALJ appointment scheme is 
unconstitutional would likely be applied prospectively and stayed for a 
period to allow the agency to correct the constitutional violations, as the 
Supreme Court did when it declared the bankruptcy courts 
unconstitutional.121
III. COMMISSION RESPONSES
The SEC has responded to some of this criticism by adopting several 
proposed changes to its Rules of Practice and by promulgating guidance 
regarding the Enforcement Division’s approach to forum selection in 
contested actions.  In addition, evidence shows that the SEC may be easing 
its increased use of administrative proceedings.122  However, the SEC has 
refused to fix the Appointments Clause violation by having the full 
Commission ratify its ALJs’ appointments.123
557 U.S. 137, 154 (2009) (explaining the need for finality and noting that if the “law were 
otherwise, and courts could evaluate the jurisdiction that they may or may not have had to 
issue a final judgment, the rules of res judicata . . . would be entirely short circuited”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 120.  Hardy, Kendall, & Rein, supra note 119 (citing United States v. L.A. Trucker 
Truck Lines, 344 U.S. 33, 38 (1952) (holding that “a defect in the appointment of [an ALJ 
precursor] was, if properly raised, an irregularity which would invalidate a resulting order”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 121.  Northern Pacific Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87-88 
(1982).
 122.  See Jean Eaglesham, SEC Trims Use of In-House Judges, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 11, 
2015, 9:00 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-trims-use-of-in-house-judges-
1444611604 [https://perma.cc/D2MD-B6ME] (noting that over July, August, and 
September of 2015, the SEC proceeded administratively in only four of its thirty-six 
contested cases).  The SEC has also proceeded in federal court for all twenty people against 
whom it has brought contested insider-trading charges since Hill. Id.
 123.  See Letter from the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, Federal Programs 
Branch to The Honorable Richard M. Berman regarding Duka v. SEC, No. 15-cv-357 
(RMB) (June 15, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/files/2015/06/dukavsec-
secanswtoberman.pdf [https://perma.cc/UWR3-EVM7] (“The government believes that the 
Commission should not act precipitously to modify its ALJ scheme.  This is particularly the 
case when the SEC has over 100 litigated proceedings at various stages of the administrative 
process and the ALJ scheme has been in use for seven decades and is grounded in a highly-
regulated competitive service system that Congress created for the selection, hiring and 
appointment of ALJs in the Executive Branch.”).  
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A. Adopting Amendments to the Rules of Practice 
On September 9, 2015, the SEC issued a press release announcing 
proposed amendments to “modernize” its Rules of Practice.124  Primarily, 
the proposed rules sought to address the short period of time a respondent 
has to prepare for an administrative hearing and the absence of any real 
opportunity for a respondent to take discovery.125  The Commission 
adopted the proposed amendments on July 13, 2016.126
First, the amendments extend the deadline by which an ALJ must 
issue an initial decision.127  Specifically, the amended Rule 360 implements 
a change in the deadline for the initial ALJ decision from 300 days from 
the date of service of the OIP to as much as 120 days from the completion 
of post-hearing or other dispositive briefing.128  The amended Rule also 
provides a four to ten month range of time in which the administrative 
hearing must begin, thus more than doubling the current amount of time in 
which respondents may prepare for a hearing.129  Further, the amended Rule 
creates a procedure for extending the initial decision deadline by up to 
thirty days.130
While the SEC’s attempt to give respondents more time to prepare for 
administrative hearings is a step in the right direction, the amended rule 
does not materially increase the amount of time respondents have to 
prepare a meaningful defense.  While under the amended rule respondents 
have up to an additional six months to prepare for a hearing, even ten 
months is often insufficient to fully review the SEC’s investigative record 
and prepare for a hearing, especially in an age of electronic discovery 
where the investigative file can include millions of electronic documents 
and other communications.131  A more reasonable timeline, such as a 
 124.  Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Proposes to 
Amend Rules Governing Administrative Proceedings, Release No. 2015-209 (Sept. 24, 
2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-209.html [https://perma.cc/R7SL-
TXN6]. 
 125.  Id.
 126.  Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Adopts 
Amendments to Rules of Practice for Administrative Proceedings, Release No. 2016-142 
(July 13, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-142.html 
[https://perma.cc/T6RQ-VFS9]. 
 127.  U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Amendments to Commission’s Rules 
of Practice, Exchange Act Release No. 34-78319, Rule 360 (July 13, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2016/34-78319.pdf [https://perma.cc/2UAA-BWUR] 
[hereinafter Amended Rules]. 
 128.  17 C.F.R. 201.360. 
 129.  Id.
 130.  Id.
 131.  In Chau, supra note 75, the SEC’s investigative file was reportedly larger than the 
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minimum of one year, would give respondents a better ability to assess 
their cases at an earlier stage and may prompt earlier settlement discussions 
and more useful Wells submissions.132  At any rate, ALJs should be able to 
grant motions requesting extensions greater than thirty days for good cause. 
Second, the amendments attempt to provide respondents with a greater 
opportunity to develop arguments and defenses during discovery.  While 
the pre-amendment rules did not provide for depositions, the amended Rule 
233 permits each side to take up to three depositions in a single-respondent 
administrative proceeding, or up to five depositions in an administrative 
proceeding involving multiple respondents.133  The amended Rule also 
permits the ALJ to allow up to an additional two depositions upon a 
showing of compelling need and allows a party to ask the ALJ to subpoena 
documents in connection with a deposition.134  The amended rules also 
adopt processes related to depositions that are similar to the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure.135  Separately, the amended rules clarify that hearsay 
evidence should be excluded if it is unreliable, although hearsay evidence 
may still be admitted if it is relevant, material, and bears satisfactory 
indicia of reliability so that its use is fair.136
While the amended rules allow each respondent to gather from 
witnesses a modest additional amount of information beyond what is 
contained in the SEC’s file, the permitted number of depositions is 
insufficient to level the playing field, especially in multi-respondent cases 
in which respondents may have divergent interests and may wish to depose 
different witnesses.  Even if the respondents’ interests were perfectly 
aligned, the number of relevant witnesses is likely to be greater than five or 
seven, especially since the rules contain no separate provision for expert 
witnesses and fact and expert witnesses are treated alike.  Since the 
Enforcement Division can interview an unlimited number of witnesses over 
a number of years, allowing respondents between three and seven 
depositions does not provide respondents with a significant procedural 
protection.  Whatever the number of permitted depositions is, ALJs should 
be given discretion to allow a respondent to take more than two additional 
depositions for good cause. 
entire printed Library of Congress.  In re Harding Advisory and Wing F. Chau, Adm. Proc. 
File. No. 3-15574, at 2 (Jan. 24, 2014).  
 132.  After the Commission sends a letter to an entity informing it that the Commission 
is planning to bring an enforcement action against it (a “Wells Notice”), the potential 
respondent may “submit a written statement to the Commission setting forth their interests 
and position with regard to the subject matter of the investigation.” 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(c).  
 133.  Amended Rules, Rule 233. 
 134.  Id.
 135.  Id.
 136.  Amended Rules, Rule 320.  
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While clarifying that “unreliable” hearsay is inadmissible is a positive 
for respondents, the amended rules give no guidance as to what hearsay is 
reliable and what hearsay is unreliable.  The Rules of Practice should adopt 
the Federal Rules of Evidence and its hearsay exceptions, at least in cases 
involving non-regulated entities, so that the SEC cannot forum shop to 
ensure that its preferred evidence is admissible.  Overall, while the 
amendments to the Rules of Practice are a step in the right direction, 
respondents still have too little time to prepare for hearings, respondents 
still have too little opportunity to develop defenses through discovery and 
depositions, and the SEC may still rely on hearsay evidence. 
B. Issuing Guidance Regarding Forum Selection 
The Commission has also promulgated guidance laying out its 
approach to forum selection in contested actions, perhaps in an effort to 
prevent Equal Protection challenges.137  While noting that there is “no rigid 
formula dictating the choice of forum,” the Commission will recommend 
the forum that “will best utilize the Commission’s limited resources to 
carry out its mission.”138  The guidance lays out four relevant 
considerations.  First, the Enforcement Division will consider the 
availability of desired claims, legal theories, and forms of relief in each 
forum.139  Some actions can only be pursued administratively, such as 
where the Commission charges failure to supervise, while others, such as 
control person liability, must be brought in federal district court.140
Likewise, only a federal district court can issue emergency relief, such as 
temporary restraining orders, asset freezes, and document preservation 
orders.141
 137.  Gupta v. S.E.C., 796 F. Supp. 2d 503, 506-07 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), provides an 
example of when a decision to proceed administratively rather than in federal court may 
raise equal protection issues.  In response to the infamous Raj Rajaratnam and Galleon 
Group insider-trading scheme, the SEC filed 28 of its 29 enforcement actions in the 
Southern District of New York, but initially pursued its case against former Goldman Sachs 
and Procter & Gamble board member Rajat Gupta administratively. Id. After Gupta filed a 
complaint in the Southern District of New York alleging that “the SEC’s unjustified 
decision to deprive Gupta, alone, of the opportunity to contest these allegations in federal 
court singles him out for uniquely unfavorable treatment in violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Constitution,” the SEC dismissed the administrative proceeding and filed suit 
in federal district court. Id.
 138.  U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of Enforcement Approach to 
Forum Selection in Contested Actions, at 1, www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcement-
approach-forum-selection-contested-actions.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VGL-P2WC]. 
 139.  Id.
 140.  Id.
 141.  Id.
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Second, the Division will consider whether any charged party is a 
registered entity or an individual associated with a registered entity.142
Regulated entities have long been subject to administrative proceedings and 
ALJs may have expertise and experience in certain issues that frequently 
arise involving such entities, both of which favor bringing charges against 
regulated entities administratively.143
Third, the Division will consider the cost-, resource-, and time-
effectiveness of litigation in each forum.144  Consideration of efficient and 
effective use of the Commission’s limited resources weighs in favor of 
bringing cases administratively, where actions are heard more quickly, but 
the ability to seek relief against multiple diverse parties in a single 
proceeding weighs in favor of federal district court.145  Efficiencies 
associated with motions for summary judgment weigh in favor of federal 
district court if the disputed issues can be decided at that stage, since 
motions for summary judgment in federal district court can address a broad 
range of issues while motions for summary disposition in administrative 
proceedings are much more limited.146  However, the longer time frame and 
larger amount of available pretrial discovery in federal district court present 
a number of efficiency costs.147
Finally, and most controversially, the Division will consider which 
forum leads to the most fair, consistent, and effective resolutions of 
securities law issues and matters.148  Since ALJs and the Commission have 
extensive knowledge and experience concerning the federal securities laws 
and complex or technical securities industry practices and products, “if a 
contested matter is likely to raise unsettled and complex legal issues under 
the federal securities laws, or interpretation of the Commission’s rules,” the 
Commission will consider whether obtaining a Commission decision on 
those issues will “facilitate development of the law.”149  If state law or 
another specialized area of federal law is at issue, federal district court may 
be more appropriate.150
While the guidance is helpful in attacking the perception that the 
Commission is simply taking its tougher cases to its ALJs, the guidelines 
put the Commission’s own efficiency interests above all else and do not 
give weight to how a particular forum will affect the rights of a respondent.  
 142.  Id. at 2.
 143.  Id.
 144.  Id.
 145.  Id.
 146.  Id. at 3. 
 147.  Id.
 148.  Id.
149.  Id. 
 150.  Id.
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The fourth consideration is by far the most significant.  By seeking to bring 
more cases with complex and unsettled legal issues in-house, the 
Commission exacerbates the criticism voiced by Judge Rakoff and others 
that the Commission should expose novel applications of the securities law 
to de novo judicial review.151  The Commission’s indication that it will 
“send[] the toughest cases to its own judges to develop the law as it prefers 
rather than using federal district judges, who may be less amenable to its 
arguments,” takes on particular weight under Chevron.152  Given the 
considerable deference that SEC interpretations enjoy, the check that 
judicial review purportedly provides on the SEC may not be particularly 
meaningful. 
Justice Scalia questioned whether the SEC’s interpretations of the 
securities laws are actually owed such deference, especially when a 
violation can result in criminal prosecution in addition to civil charges.153
According to Justice Scalia, federal appellate deference to the SEC’s 
interpretations of statutory provisions to which criminal prohibitions are 
attached, such as Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
means that the SEC “can in effect create (and uncreate) new crimes at will, 
so long as they do not roam beyond ambiguities that the laws contain.”154
Essentially, the SEC’s guidance suggests that the Commission should 
shape the law before it reaches a federal appeals court, at which point 
appellate judges should defer to the Commission’s expertise in deciding 
what constitutes a violation. 
Overall, the proposed guidance does not meaningfully constrain the 
scope of the Enforcement Division’s discretion in seeking a particular 
venue, but rather affirms the Commission’s view that forum selection is 
within its broad discretion without meaningful limitations. 
CONCLUSION
One defense attorney has aptly summed up the perceived conflict of 
interest that arises when the SEC brings cases administratively: 
The SEC makes the rules, interprets the rules, revises the rules 
without public notice and comment, reverses the rules on 
 151.  See Rakoff, supra note 45 (noting the author’s concern that the SEC may be 
becoming a “law unto itself”). 
 152.  Peter J. Henning, Choosing the Battlefield in S.E.C. Cases, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/12/business/dealbook/choosing-the-battlefield-in-
sec-cases.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/6CEF-SLWY]. 
 153.  Whitman v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 352, 353 (2014) (mem.) (Scalia, J., joined by 
Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (“[L]egislatures, not executive officers, define 
crimes.”).
 154.  Id.
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occasion, enforces the rules, and prosecutes alleged violators of 
the rules with its own attorneys.  It hires and pays its own judges, 
has its own judges hear most of the cases based on their own 
rules of evidence and decides 90 percent of those cases in its 
favor.  It hands out the punishments and penalties, and it hears all 
appeals of its judges’ decisions.  And all of this takes place 
before a federal court has any involvement in the process.155
The SEC must act quickly to reverse this perception.  The simple fix 
to the Appointments Clause issue is for the SEC to reappoint its existing 
ALJs using a constitutionally appropriate procedure, such as direct 
appointment by the Commissioners.  However, the SEC has not undertaken 
this fix, and it will likely continue to resist doing so either because it does 
not want to concede a point to the defense bar or because its 
Commissioners cannot agree on the necessity of doing so.  In the 
alternative, the SEC could induce potential respondents to waive the 
constitutional issue before commencing new proceedings, but that strategy 
would likely cost the Commission at the bargaining table. 
While five federal circuit courts of appeals have now ruled in favor of 
the SEC on the jurisdictional issue, the circuits are evenly split on the 
merits of the Appointments Clause question.  Respondents seeking to 
challenge the constitutionality of the SEC ALJ appointment procedure 
should first pursue their claims through to the conclusion of the 
administrative process before raising the issue in federal court.  However, 
once the administrative process is complete, respondents turning to a non-
D.C. Circuit federal court of appeals should find success.  Over the next 
several years, as enforcement actions wind through the administrative 
process and subsequent appeals properly reach the federal appellate courts, 
there is a strong likelihood that several appellate courts will side with the 
Tenth Circuit and recognize that SEC ALJs are inferior officers who trigger 
the protections of Article II.  While the Supreme Court denied certiorari in 
Bebo, it may choose to have the last word on the matter now that a circuit 
split has developed. 
Even if it ameliorates the Appointments Clause issue, the SEC must 
still take concrete steps to restore public trust.  First, the SEC should 
reverse its policy of bringing cases involving complex facts or novel legal 
issues administratively.  Such a step would assuage the concern that the 
Commission is bringing difficult cases in-house to increase its chance to 
win or to ensure that the securities laws are developed in its favor.  Second, 
the SEC should publish concrete guidance relating to its forum decisions, 
which would allow potential respondents to advocate more effectively in 
 155.  Steve Howard, Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association and its Implications for the 
SEC, 21 No. 20 WESTLAW J. DERIVATIVES 1, 7 (2015). 
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the Wells process for selection of one forum or the other.  The Commission 
could also move away from its new policy of requiring certain respondents 
to admit wrongdoing, rather than allowing them to settle while neither 
admitting nor denying wrongdoing, which would lessen the sting of 
administrative proceedings for some respondents.156
Since Congress created the administrative scheme, it may need to 
provide the remedy by legislation either significantly curtailing the SEC’s 
discretion in choosing a forum or increasing the procedural protections 
available to administrative respondents.  Federal judges should also force 
the SEC’s hand, at least regarding the Article II issue, by holding that the 
appointments of SEC ALJs must comply with the United States 
Constitution.  However change is instituted, it must take place soon to 
protect both the SEC’s legitimacy and the rights of individuals and entities 
accused of wrongdoing. 
 156.  See Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Remarks at 
the Council of Institutional Investors Fall Conference in Chicago, IL: Deploying the Full 
Enforcement Arsenal (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/
1370539841202 [https://perma.cc/T8NW-78HF] (explaining that no-admit-no-deny policies 
lead to a higher likelihood of settling, which in turn will “eliminate all litigation risk, resolve 
the case, return money to victims more quickly, and preserve our enforcement resources”).

